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SOMEONE ELSE MAY OWN A PIECE OF YOU: LACK OF FEDERAL
REGULATION OVER DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER DNA TEST KITS
Alexander (Zan) Eric Newkirk*
Direct-to-consumer DNA test kits, such as those sold by Ancestry
and 23andMe, are now more popular than ever. These test kits
require a consumer to submit a personal DNA sample in exchange
for detailed results about the consumer’s ancestry. Although about
half of the United States has a genetic privacy law, they vary in
strictness and applicability to direct-to-consumer DNA test kits.
There is currently no federal law regulating the test kit companies’
control over the DNA samples they collect, leaving the direct-toconsumer DNA test kit industry largely self-regulated. The company
policies which regulate their own control over consumer DNA can
leave room for interpretation about the limits of such control. This
lack of clear government oversight, in addition to the inherent value
of consumer DNA, creates a strong demand for an all-encompassing
federal law that creates uniform collection, storage, and use of
genetic information. Analysis of state genetic privacy laws provides
a building block upon which an effective federal genetic privacy law
can be constructed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The twenty-first century has witnessed an expansion of societal
interest from safekeeping tangible assets—such as the home, cash,
and family—to protecting intangible assets as well, such as online
bank accounts, social media, and even individual genetic identifiers.
Americans often secure their Facebook profiles with case-sensitive
passwords that require a number and a symbol to prevent
unauthorized users from gaining access.1 Most online accounts even
require that users answer highly intrusive and personal security
questions as a secondary method of access to the account in the case
the user in question forgets their login information.2 While Twitter
1
See How Can I Make My Facebook Password Strong?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/124904560921566?helpref=popular_topics (last
visited Jan. 27, 2019).
2
See, e.g., How to Update Your Security Questions & Answers, FIDELITY,
https://www.fidelity.com/customer-service/how-to-change-your-securityquestions-and-answers (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (“Security questions help
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and electronic banking sites have ramped up their defenses,
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) testing kits with limited data
security have swept the nation, leaving some test kit users’ personal
genetic information accessible to others.
Direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) genetic testing kits are marketed—
often through the internet—directly to the consumer, who sends a
DNA sample back to the testing kit company for analysis.3 The
company processes the DNA sample and sends the consumer the
results, which can include information about a person’s ancestry,
potential health issues, and more.4 Ancestry (or genealogical) testing
is considered a form of DTC genetic testing.5 The quality of these
at-home test kits varies,6 but some of the more well-known brands
perform an intricate analysis of the consumer’s DNA sample. For
example, AncestryDNA7 (“Ancestry”) analyzes all 22 pairs of nonsex chromosomes, providing a broad look at the consumer’s entire
family tree.8
The popularity of these DTC genetic testing kits has exploded in
recent years, and the trend is expected to continue.9 By the end of
Fidelity ensure it’s really you accessing your account.”); The Reason for Security
Questions, SIRIUSXM, http://siriusxmca.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/1
77/~/the-reason-for-security-questions (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (“Your
personal security questions help us verify your identity when you can’t remember
your username or password.”).
3
See What is Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF
MED.: GENETICS HOME REF. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov
/primer/dtcgenetictesting/directtoconsumer.
4
See id.
5
Id.
6
See id.
7
ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2019).
8
ANCESTRYDNA, ANCESTRYDNA 101: THE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO DNA 2,
https://www.ancestrycdn.com/support/us/2016/11/ancestrydna101.pdf.
9
See Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Market to Hit $2.5 Bn by 2024:
Global Market Insights, Inc., PRNEWSWIRE (Dec. 11, 2018, 6:00 AM)
[hereinafter Global Market Insights], https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/direct-to-consumer-genetic-testing-market-to-hit-2-5-bn-by-2024global-market-insights-inc--830436085.html; see also Leah Larkin, DNA Tests,
DNA GEEK, https://thednageek.com/dna-tests/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2019)
(displaying a graph in which less than 2.5 million people were in AncestryDNA’s
consumer database as of April 2016, whereas approximately 15 million people
were in the same database in 2019).
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2017, over twelve million consumers had submitted a DNA sample
through an at-home genetic testing kit.10 Ancestry, the leading
genealogy company, processed the DNA of more than seven million
people in that year.11 The runner-up in the competitive DTC genetic
testing market, 23andME, analyzed over three million DNA
samples.12 The concentrated market of DTC genetic testing requires
heavy promotion to stand out. Ancestry spent approximately $109
million on television and other ads in the United States in 2016.13
23andME totaled $21 million on advertisements that same year.14 As
advertising and technology advance, the DTC genetic testing
industry is expected to soar in value—with an estimated net worth
of over $2.5 billion by 2024.15
Ancestry16 prides itself on providing a comprehensive report of
a consumer’s recent genetic and ancestral history. 17 But sales of
Ancestry DTC genetic testing kits are driven by many other factors,
such as the desire to know risks for certain genetic diseases18 and the
desire to connect with long-lost relatives.19 Even when serious
10

Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up, MIT
TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017was-the-year-consumer-dna-testing-blew-up/.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
See id.
14
Id.
15
Global Market Insights, supra note 9.
16
As Ancestry dominates the DTC genetic testing market, the scope of this
article will be narrowed to discuss only Ancestry, not other companies in the same
industry.
17
AncestryDNA – Frequently Asked Questions (United States),
ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/en/legal/us/faq (last visited Jan.
19, 2019).
18
See, e.g., Global Market Insights, supra note 9 (“Predictive tests enables [sic]
identification of genetic mutation before actual manifestation resulting in early
disease diagnosis. Diagnosis of chronic disease such as cancer at an early stage
can make significant improvements in the lives of cancer patients resulting in
reduced morbidity, greater probability of surviving and less expensive
treatment.”).
19
See, e.g., John D’Anna, Here’s Five Things You Need to Know Before You
Take a Home DNA Test, AZCENTRAL (Dec. 23, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-best-reads/2018/12/23/dnatesting-privacy-what-know-before-home-genealogy-test-ancestry-23-andme-
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motives such as these are involved, the privacy policy is likely an
afterthought for a consumer.20 But this privacy policy isn’t just any
other run-of-the-mill privacy policy.21 Ancestry’s privacy policy is
contracting away consumers’ rights to arguably the most personal
asset a human has—their genetic information. As of this article’s
publication, there is no federal law regulating the storage,
disclosure, and use of this genetic information.22
The need for a uniform, all-encompassing federal law that
regulates collection, storage, and use of genetic information is
urgent. DTC genetic testing kits continue to rise in popularity while
collecting, storing, and using Americans’ DNA without federal
limitation. In Section II, this Recent Development covers Ancestry’s
privacy policy and the limits the company places on itself when
using consumers’ genetic information. Section III discusses
governmental use of DTC genetic test results. Section IV reflects on
the current legal landscape regulating use of genetic information.
Lastly, Section V describes the features of a viable federal statute
which would place external limits on DTC genetic testing
companies’ use of their consumers’ information.
golden-state-killer/2381500002/ (recommending potential DTC genetic testing
kit users purchase a kit from “the company with the largest number of samples in
its database, Ancestry,” to find genetic matches with long-lost relatives).
20
See generally Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of
Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 543–68
(2008) (stating privacy policies are “read infrequently,” and estimating Americans
would spend 67.1 billion hours per year reading privacy policies word-for-word,
if they were actually read on every website a person encountered).
21
See CARLOS JENSEN & COLIN POTTS, PRIVACY POLICIES EXAMINED: FAIR
WARNING OR FAIR GAME? 1 (2003), ftp://ftp.cc.gatech.edu/pub/gvu/tr/2003/0304.pdf (“[Privacy] policies are in many ways modeled after software license
statements.”). But see Wendy Zamora, What DNA Testing Kit Companies Are
Really Doing with Your Data, MALWAREBYTES LABS (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2018/11/dna-testing-kit-companies-reallydata/ (describing the development of privacy policies for DNA testing companies
as “pioneering work”).
22
See Genetic Information Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/genetic-information-privacy (last visited Jan. 19,
2019) (addressing the fact HIPAA only regulates “covered entities,” and pointing
out that Ancestry is one of many non-covered entities which collects genetic
information).
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II. ANCESTRYDNA PRIVACY POLICY
At nine pages long, Ancestry’s privacy policy is surprisingly
brief, considering the profound privacy interest involved in genetic
testing.23 The most recent update to the Ancestry privacy policy
emphasizes transparency, simplicity, and control of the data by the
consumer.24 The policy is prefaced with a few statements of
reassurance to address potential concerns of Ancestry consumers,
including: the fact that consumers may make unexpected discoveries
(i.e. discovering your mother is not your genetic relative, thus not
your actual mother); the ability to manage and delete DNA and DNA
data as described in the privacy policy; and a reminder to remain
confident in Ancestry’s use of consumers’ data.25 This last statement
raises the question as to why would someone be worried about how
their personal data is being used.
A. Evolution of the Ancestry Privacy Policy
Ancestry began selling DTC genetic test kits in 2002, sixteen
years after the introduction of its website;26 hence, its privacy policy
was not originally prepared to dictate how consumer DNA data was
managed or disclosed. The current privacy policy is a part of a
constantly evolving agreement that has been shaped in part by public
criticism.27 In the October 14, 2016 update to the Ancestry privacy
policy, the company stated, “we cannot guarantee and we do not
warrant that loss, misuse, or alteration of data will not occur, and we
are not responsible for the theft, destruction, or inadvertent
disclosure of your information.”28 In May 2017, a consumer
23

See Zamora, supra note 21 (mentioning a comprehensive DNA testing
company privacy policy that is twenty-one pages long). For the full text of the
Ancestry
privacy
policy,
see
Your
Privacy,
ANCESTRYDNA,
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
24
See Your Privacy, supra note 23.
25
See id.
26
See Our Story, ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/aboutancestry/our-story (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
27
See Eric Heath, Setting the Record Straight: Ancestry and Your DNA,
ANCESTRYDNA (May 21, 2017), https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/
2017/05/21/setting-the-record-straight-ancestry-and-your-dna/.
28
Ancestry Privacy Statement, ANCESTRYDNA (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement
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protection litigator in New Jersey claimed that Ancestry’s privacy
policy and terms of service awarded the company an ownership
interest in the consumers’ DNA sample in perpetuity, while the
consumers’ ownership was measured only in years.29 Immediately
after publication of the New Jersey attorney’s statement, Eric Heath,
Chief Privacy Officer of Ancestry, addressed those claims in a blog
post, which included a link to the updated Ancestry terms and
conditions.30 Heath ended his address to the public stating
“[Ancestry has] language throughout the process of activating a test
that clarifies and limits what [Ancestry] can and can’t do with [the
consumer’s] data” because consumer genomics “is still a new
industry.”31 There is no clarification in the blog post about what
“test” Heath references or how the “test” sets limits on consumer
data disclosure. The public response by one of Ancestry’s top
personnel demonstrates that Ancestry, and not some external
force—such as federal government, restricts the level of ownership
by the consumer and the company in the consumer’s DNA sample.
Ancestry also sets forth in its privacy policy when a consumer’s
personal information, including genetic data, may be shared with
another person.32 These circumstances are discussed in-depth below.
B. Circumstances Under Which a User’s Personal
Information may be Shared
Although some consumers may believe that the submission of
their DNA was just a quick “in-and-out” experiment, the DNA
sample can remain in possession of Ancestry indefinitely.33 After the
DNA sample has been processed, the DNA and saliva are deidentified (removed of the individual’s name and other identifying
markers) and stored in an encrypted database for consumer
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171205204523/https://www.ancestry.com/cs/leg
al/privacystatement].
29
See Joel Winston, Ancestry.com Takes DNA Ownership Rights from
Customers and Their Relatives, THINKPROGRESS (May 17, 2017, 7:54 PM),
https://thinkprogress.org/ancestry-com-takes-dna-ownership-rights-fromcustomers-and-their-relatives-dbafeed02b9e/.
30
See Heath, supra note 27.
31
See id.
32
See Your Privacy, supra note 23.
33
See id.
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protection.34 The samples and information are stored so that they are
available for “future testing.”35 This future testing is only performed
if a customer gives informed consent for further research.36 The
research is executed in collaboration with third-party researchers for
the purpose of better understanding “population history, human
migration and improv[ing] human health.”37 The third-party
researchers include, but are not limited to, academic institutions,
non-profits, for-profit businesses, and government agencies.38 Some
of these institutions even provide compensation to Ancestry for the
right to access consumer DNA.39
Personal information may also be shared when a consumer
chooses to share private details with other Ancestry members.40 This
is usually done in order to connect with a “DNA match” who may
be a potential relative and to allow members to trade stories about
their ancestors and/or personal lives.41 Personal information may be
shared with other service providers whom Ancestry depends on to
complete the transaction with the consumer, or if Ancestry is bought
out by another company.42 Service providers of Ancestry generally
include laboratory partners, shipping providers, and sample storage
facilities.43 The service providers and any potential acquiring
company are also subject to the same privacy policy. 44 Personal
information can be shared when Ancestry publishes aggregated
data, such as “noting the percentage of immigrants in a state that are
34

See id. But see Cassie Martin, Privacy and Consumer Genetic Testing Don’t
Always
Mix,
SCIENCENEWS
(June
5,
2018,
7:00
AM),
https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/science-public/privacy-and-consumergenetic-testing-dont-always-mix (warning that some scientists believe encrypted
genetic information may be hacked and decrypted with the use of other publiclyavailable information).
35
See Your Privacy, supra note 23.
36
See id.
37
AncestryDNA Informed Consent, ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry
.com/dna/lp/informedconsent-v4-en (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
38
See id.
39
See id.
40
See Your Privacy, supra note 23.
41
See id.
42
See id.
43
See id.
44
See id.
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from a particular geographic region or country”.45 Ancestry follows
this statement with a disclaimer that the aggregated data does not
provide individual personal information.46
Lastly, personal data can be shared when Ancestry believes “it
is reasonably necessary to: comply with valid legal process (e.g.
subpoenas, warrants); enforce or apply the Ancestry Terms and
Conditions; protect the security or integrity of the Services; or
protect the rights, property, or safety, or Ancestry, our employees or
users.”47 The most available data about any of these circumstantial
uses relates to law enforcement requests for user information. 48
Ancestry releases an annual transparency report on how many
requests they receive for personal information from law
enforcement.49 In 2017, Ancestry reported granting thirty-one of
thirty-four valid requests for information, all of which pertained to
investigations involving credit card misuse and identity theft.50
III. ACTUAL USE OF DTC GENETIC TEST KIT RESULTS BY LAW
ENFORCEMENT
In recent news, DTC genetic test kit results have reportedly been
used to help solve murder cold cases and identify dead bodies.51 One
of the primary detective agencies is Parabon NanoLabs (“Parabon”).
Parabon does not obtain the genetic data used in solving these cases
directly from a DTC genetic test kit company.52 Rather, Parabon
uses the services of GEDmatch, a database of DTC genetic test
results voluntarily submitted by users.53

45

See id.
See id.
47
Id.
48
See id.
49
See
Ancestry
2018
Transparency
Report,
ANCESTRYDNA,
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/transparency (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
50
Id.
51
See, e.g., Kate Snow & Jon Schuppe, ‘This is Just the Beginning’: Using DNA
and Genealogy to Crack Years-Old Cold Cases, NBC NEWS (July 18, 2018, 4:30
AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/just-beginning-using-dnagenealogy-crack-years-old-cold-cases-n892126.
52
See id.
53
See id.
46
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A. Parabon’s Success
Parabon has worked with police departments across the nation
to make arrests in numerous cold cases and identify deceased
individuals.54 The company advertises this assistance as “Snapshot
Genetic Genealogy Service,” which “combines new DNA testing
methods with genetic and traditional genealogical research to
uncover the likely identity of a perpetrator or identify human
remains.”55 The Snapshot service was so effective and widelydesired that it closed more than one cold case every two weeks
across the United States in its first 100 days of business.56 Parabon’s
Chief Genealogist, Cece Moore, describes the Snapshot process as
follows:
[O]nce [Moore] gets a DNA profile from Parabon, [Moore] uploads it
into GEDmatch and compiles a list of relatives, narrowing it down to a
second or third-cousin, or closer. [Moore] builds the family tree
backward to common ancestors—usually the great- or great-great
grandparents. Then [Moore] turns forward in time, filling out more
branches and narrowing down her search using publicly available data,
including obituaries, wedding announcements and social media. [Moore]
compiles a list of people who fit the profile of a possible suspect and
gives it to police, who take it from there.57

This explanation makes clear that a consumer’s DTC genetic test
kit results can reveal valuable information about the consumer’s
relatives, who may not have consented to the public display of such
material. This caused concern for Curtis Rogers, the founder of
GEDmatch, and led him to quickly revise his company’s privacy
policy to inform patrons they were free to remove their
information.58 Despite this warning, many declined to remove their
GEDmatch profile, and the site continues to add approximately
1,500 new profiles a day.59
54

See id.
Parabon® Announces 10th Solved Case in First 100 Days of Snapshot®
Genetic Genealogy Service, PARABON NANOLABS (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://parabon-nanolabs.com/news-events/2018/09/snapshot-geneticgenealogy-10-solves-in-first-100-days.html.
56
Id.
57
Snow & Schuppe, supra note 51.
58
See id.
59
See id.
55
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A closer look at the revised GEDmatch privacy policy describes
a number of ways a patron of GEDmatch can upload “raw” DNA
data to the website. Aside from being allowed to upload one’s own
DNA, GEDmatch allows patrons to upload the:
DNA of a person who has granted [a patron] specific authorization to
upload their DNA to GEDmatch; DNA of a person known by [a patron]
to be deceased; and DNA obtained and authorized by law enforcement
to either: (1) identify a perpetrator of a violent crime against another
individual; or (2) identify remains of a deceased individual[.] 60

The privacy policy defines “violent crime” as homicide or sexual
assault, but there is no description of what qualifies as “specific
authorization.”61 A few lines down, the privacy policy states
“GEDmatch will not be responsible for any raw data provided to
GEDmatch in violation of this Policy.”62 This statement is an attempt
to remove all liability from the entity that originally made it possible
to freely share genetic code among the public. The privacy policy
seems to discourage misuse of another person’s DTC genetic test
results, but the policy does not specify how tightly the company
regulates or enforces it.63
For example, the policy does not describe the process for
confirming that certain DNA was authorized for upload, from a dead
individual, or “obtained and authorized by law enforcement” prior
to upload on GEDmatch.64 Nor is there a description of the process
for confirming that DNA is being used to “identify a perpetrator of
a violent crime” or “identify the remains of a deceased individual.”65
This sheds light on a vulnerability many may not have expected.
Without a clear definition of “specific authorization,” there is an
opportunity for practically anybody who has access to another’s
DTC genetic test results to upload them on GEDmatch for the world
to see. These results could be available to law enforcement,
insurance providers, and others who have reason to discriminate
60
GEDmatch.com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH,
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated May 20, 2018).
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See id.
64
See id.
65
See id.
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against an individual on the basis of their genetic makeup. The
policy even states that “future genealogical and non-genealogical
uses [of genetic data] may be developed, including uses that
GEDmatch cannot predict or foresee[,]”66 indicating the company
hosting these services has no idea how much potential there is for
misuse of genetic data. In the absence of any federal law, the only
entity capable of preventing potential misuse, the DTC company,
has already attempted to remove all liability via its privacy policy.
Yet, if companies such as GEDmatch are not held accountable in
protecting personal genetic data displayed on their website, then
who will?
B. Legislative Response to Law Enforcement Use of DTC
Genetic Test Results
Some state officials have already taken steps toward holding
genealogy databases accountable for any potential misuse of
personal genetic data. A Maryland legislator, Charles Sydnor, is
advocating for the protection of the public’s genetic data from law
enforcement.67 Sydnor believes use of the genealogy databases is an
overreach and even a violation of the United States Constitution.68
Sydnor introduced a bill that would ban law enforcement use of
genetic data accessible on genealogy sites, because he believes that
just because one person may want to perform a DTC genetic test
should not mean that person’s extended family is also subject to a
search by the state.69 However, Maryland law enforcement is heavily
opposed to the bill and references the successful identification of
violent criminals that would not have been possible without police
access to genealogy sites.70
Although this Maryland bill is not guaranteed to fully protect the
public’s genetic data from misuse, or guaranteed to even become
66

Id.
Lindsay Watts, Maryland Lawmaker Proposes Bill to Ban Police Use of DNA
Databases, FOX 5 DC (Feb. 11, 2019, 10:22 PM), https://www.fox5dc.com
/news/local-news/maryland-lawmaker-proposes-bill-to-ban-police-use-of-dnadatabases.
68
See id.
69
See id.
70
See id.
67
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law, it is an attempt to further balance the Fourth Amendment rights
of DTC genetic test kit consumers with the urgency of some law
enforcement investigations.71 In urgent situations, such as a
homicide or discovery of a dead body, law enforcement will likely
want to use all tools available to its investigation. So why shouldn’t
law enforcement be able to use a DTC genetic test kit consumer’s
genetic data that was voluntarily posted to a public genealogy site?
C. Law Enforcement Access to Genetic Data Pursuant to the
Third-Party Doctrine
Public genealogy information that was voluntarily submitted
may be accessible by law enforcement pursuant to the third-party
doctrine. The third-party doctrine “stems from the notion that an
individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information
knowingly shared with another.”72 An individual who shares
information with a third party cannot expect the third party to refrain
from divulging the information to others, including the
government.73 This allows law enforcement to use information that
has been knowingly shared with others.74 The doctrine originates
from two 1970s Supreme Court cases, Smith v. Maryland and United
States v. Miller, and has been most recently re-shaped by Carpenter
v. United States.75
In Smith, the Court rejected the defendant’s claim that law
enforcement’s use of a pen register constituted a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment because the pen register only kept record of

See id. (quoting Charles Sydnor, who said, “I may want to perform a DNA
search on Ancestry.com, but I don’t think that should subject my children and
their children and their children’s children to a state search.”).
72
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
73
See id. at 2216.
74
See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (holding it constitutional for law
enforcement to access up to six days’-worth of cell-site records to track the
defendant’s location over time); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding
law enforcement’s use of a pen register to identify the phone number defendant
dialed constitutional); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (finding bank
notes voluntarily handed over to the bank by the defendant admissible against the
defendant).
75
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
71
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what number was being dialed.76 The dialed numbers were also
given to the telephone company upon making a call.77 Since the
defendant voluntarily informed the telephone company of the
numbers he dialed, the defendant no longer had an expectation of
privacy as to which numbers he dialed.78
In Miller, the Court found no legitimate expectation of privacy
in the defendant’s financial statements which were subpoenaed by
law enforcement.79 The financial statements contained only
information which was routinely exposed to employees of the
bank.80 Once the defendant handed this information over to the bank,
the defendant assumed the risk that this information could be
conveyed to the government.81
The Court in Carpenter delved deeper into the third-party
doctrine to address the fact that technology has advanced far beyond
pen registers and bank statements, in turn making a much greater
wealth of information available to law enforcement.82 In this case,
the Court found that law enforcement’s use of cell-site records to
track defendant’s location was a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.83 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
frequently analogized to the situations at hand in Smith and Miller.84
Eventually, the Court drew the following distinction:
[T]he fact of diminished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth
Amendment falls out of the picture entirely. Smith and Miller, after all,
did not rely solely on the act of sharing. Instead, they considered the
76

Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
Id.
78
Id. at 743–44.
79
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
80
See id.
81
See id. at 443.
82
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (“As Justice Brandeis explained in his famous
dissent, the Court is obligated—as ‘[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of
invading privacy have become available to the Government’—to ensure that the
‘progress of science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections. [citation
omitted]. Here the progress of science has afforded law enforcement a powerful
new tool to carry out its important responsibilities. At the same time, this tool
risks Government encroachment of the sort the Framers, ‘after consulting the
lessons of history,’ drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.”).
83
Id. at 2220.
84
See generally id.
77
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nature of the particular documents sought to determine whether there is
a
legitimate
expectation
of
privacy
concerning
their
contents. Smith pointed out the limited capabilities of a pen register; . . .
telephone call logs reveal little in the way of identifying information.
Miller likewise noted that checks were not confidential communications
but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions. 85

The Court found the “unique nature of cell phone location
information” and the lack of “any affirmative act on the part of the
user beyond powering up [the cell phone]” involved privacy issues
far greater than those in Smith and Miller.86 Although this ruling was
a step back from strict adherence to the third-party doctrine, the
doctrine remains good law.87 The Court was careful not to
extrapolate the findings in Carpenter to future cases which may also
present an issue with the third-party doctrine, in fear of
“embarrass[ing] the future.”88 In response to Justice Gorsuch’s
suggestion that the Court address what constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy in similar situations, the majority responded
with “we ‘do not begin to claim all the answers today,’ and therefore
decide no more than the case before us.”89
In light of this narrow ruling, uncertainty lies ahead for
consumers of Ancestry’s DTC genetic test kits. With the third-party
doctrine still intact, Carpenter leaves unclear whether there is any
legitimate expectation of privacy in voluntarily-posted genetic data
that could provide Fourth Amendment protections from government
intrusion. The Court may be waiting for an opportunity to “tread
carefully” on the issue once it has all of the relevant facts pertaining
to DTC genetic test kits.
If the Court were to grant certiorari to such a case, it would likely
analogize the facts of the case to precedent in the same manner as it
did in Carpenter. Genetic data does not have much in common with
the “limited capabilities” of a pen register employed in Smith, nor is
it comparable to the “negotiable instruments” used in Miller.
85

Id. at 2219 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 2220.
87
See id. (“[W]e do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller.”).
88
Id. at 2220 (“As Justice Frankfurter noted when considering new innovations
in airplanes and radios, the Court must tread carefully in such cases, to ensure that
we do not ‘embarrass the future.’”).
89
Id. at 2220 n.4 (citation omitted).
86
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However, the cell-site records used to track the defendant in
Carpenter share a bit more in common with genetic data. Whereas
the cell-site records are able to locate where an individual is, or has
been, genetic data is able to pinpoint the geographical origins of an
individual. Since genetic data can be used for much more than
simply identifying a person’s ancestry, one could reason that genetic
information is of an even more “unique nature” than cell-site
records, thus Fourth Amendment protections should extend to
consumers of DNA genetic test kits. In addition, the lack of any
“affirmative act” beyond “powering up” the cell phone could be
paralleled to the lack of any affirmative act beyond a consumer
“activating” their test kit by submitting their DNA sample.
Following the above reasoning, the Court would presumably
rule government access to genetic data on a public domain a
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the
third-party doctrine would not excuse law enforcement’s
unauthorized access of genetic data in the public domain.
Nonetheless, this is all speculation into a future scenario in which
the Court is presented with a case of genetic data misuse. For the
time being, these issues belong solely to the legislature for
resolution.
IV. CURRENT REGULATION OF INDIVIDUAL GENETIC
INFORMATION
As technology advances and new genealogical innovations are
unveiled, the law must follow suit to address whether any
restrictions should be set on the use or possession of such
technology. This section reveals the flaws in current genetic data
protection legislation and focuses on the potential for misuse of this
data that could not have possibly been foreseen by legislators
enacting these laws. Furthermore, the absence of a federal law which
tightly polices the actions of companies in the DTC genetic test kit
industry creates an unregulated field of uncertainty. Fortunately,
some of the states have established laws that place limits on what
DTC genetic test kit companies can do with a person’s genetic data.
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A. Genetic Information is Largely Unregulated in the United
States
As of this Recent Development’s publication, there remains no
uniform, all-encompassing federal law which regulates the
collection, storage, or use of genetic data by private or government
organizations.90 States without their own genetic information
privacy laws leave their citizens’ genetic data protected only by
outdated federal privacy laws, whose drafters could not have
foreseen the normalized and voluntary collection of individuals’
DNA.91 If state or federal laws such as the Privacy Act of 1974 (“the
Privacy Act”), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974 (“FERPA”), the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) do not protect the citizens’
genetic data, then all discretion lies with the private or government
organization in deciding how to collect, store, or use that
information.92 Most of these regulations were intended for a purpose
other than protecting citizens from their own voluntarily-submitted
DNA from being used against them. For this reason, those laws
would not directly apply to companies that handle DTC test kit
results nor would the laws govern others’ use of the genetic data.
The Privacy Act of 1974 was enacted to prohibit disclosure of
records with personal identifiers (such as social security number,
name, or birthday) without written consent of the individual to
whom the records relate.93 This statute only restricts the actions of
federal agencies and covers only the records controlled by those

90

See Genetic Information Privacy, supra note 22.
See Danny Thakkar, Biometric Regulations in the U.S. States: The State of
Play, BAYOMETRIC, https://www.bayometric.com/biometric-regulations-usstates/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
92
See id.; see also Genetic Information Privacy, supra note 22.
93
See Freedom of Info. Act Div., The Privacy Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/foia/privacy/ index.html; see
also 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012) (“Conditions of disclosure. -- No agency shall
disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of
communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written
request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record
pertains . . . .”).
91
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agencies.94 The largest DTC genetic test kit manufacturer, Ancestry,
cannot fall within the scope of the Privacy Act as the company is
privately-owned.95
FERPA was also enacted in 197496 to protect the educational
records of American students.97 FERPA applies to any educational
institution that receives funding from the United States Department
of Education.98 Since Ancestry is not an educational institution and
does not report receiving any funds from the Department of
Education, it is unlikely Ancestry is within the scope of FERPA’s
regulation.
HIPAA was enacted by the United States’ government on
August 21, 1996, for the purpose of setting a national standard for
the protection of certain health information.99 The regulation
94

See Freedom of Info. Act Div., supra note 93; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(defining “agency” as an entity that meets 12 requirements, the first of which is
maintaining records required by statute or executive order).
95
See Company Facts, ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/
about-ancestry/company-facts (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).
96
Legislative History of Major FERPA Provisions, U.S. DEP’T ED. (last
modified Feb. 11, 2004), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/leghistory.html; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“No funds shall be
made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or
institution which has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the
parents of students who are or have been in attendance at a school of such agency
or at such institution, as the case may be, the right to inspect and review the
education records of their children.”); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513(b)(1), 88 Stat. 484 (1974).
97
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), U.S. DEP’T ED. (last
modified Mar. 1, 2018), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/
index.html?src=rn.
98
See id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(3) (2012) (“For the purposes of this
section the term ‘educational agency or institution’ means any public or private
agency or institution which is the recipient of funds under any applicable
program.”).
99
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1 (2013); see also Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996)
(“An Act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve portability and
continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets, to
combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to
promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care
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protects “health information,” which includes genetic
information,100 from disclosure by organizations referred to as
“covered entities.”101 A “covered entity” is defined as “(1) A health
plan[;] (2) A health care clearinghouse[; or] (3) A health care
provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in
connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter.”102 None
of these definitions would classify Ancestry, or any other DTC
genetic test kit manufacturer, as a “covered entity.” In certain
situations, HIPAA may also apply to a “business associate.”103 But
DTC genetic testing companies would not classify as a “business
associate” under the Act’s definition so long as the company were
not working in adjunct with a covered entity.104 Ancestry states in its
services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health insurance, and for
other purposes.”).
100
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HIPAA ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION 14 (2013); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320d9(a) (2012).
101
See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 99; see also § 1320d-1(a).
102
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 100, at 11; see also § 1320d-1(a).
103
Id. at 11. Section 160.102 of the Act, titled “Applicability” states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the standards, requirements, and
implementation specifications adopted under this subchapter apply to the
following entities:
(1) A health plan.
(2) A health care clearinghouse.
(3) A health care provider who transmits any health information in
electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this
subchapter.
(b) Where provided, the standards, requirements, and implementation
specifications adopted under this subchapter apply to a business
associate.
104
See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 100, at 11. Section 160.103 of this
Act, titled “Definitions,” states:
(3) Business associate includes:
(i) A Health Information Organization, E-prescribing Gateway, or other
person that provides data transmission services with respect to protected
health information to a covered entity and that requires access on a
routine basis to such protected health information.
(ii) A person that offers a personal health record to one or more
individuals on behalf of a covered entity.
(iii) A subcontractor that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits
protected health information on behalf of the business associate.
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privacy policy that it does not share genetic information with
“insurance companies, employers, or third-party marketers without
[the consumer’s] express consent”105—meaning Ancestry does not
work in adjunct with covered entities without the consumer’s
affirmative consent. Thus, HIPAA does not apply to Ancestry and
does not provide any sort of genetic privacy to its consumers.
GINA was enacted on May 21, 2008, to protect citizens from
having their genetic information used to discriminate against them
in health coverage and employment situations.106 As stated in the
previous paragraph, Ancestry does not share genetic information
with either insurance companies or employers without the
consumer’s informed consent. Consequently, without the informed
consent of a consumer, Ancestry does not fall within the scope of
GINA. With the exception of GINA, all of these federal laws were
enacted before Ancestry began selling DTC genetic test kits. 107
Therefore, lawmakers could not have possibly anticipated the
potential for misuse of large amounts of personal genetic data found
in databases as large as Ancestry’s. The only federal law of interest
enacted after the sale of DTC genetic test kits is GINA, but this law
was implemented long before the massive surge in popularity of
these test kits.108 GINA also only focuses on the potential for
discrimination by an employer or insurer with a person’s genetic
data, rather than regulating the broader issue of potential for general
misuse of personal genetic data. This leaves state legislatures to deal
with the issue of implementing laws aimed at preventing general
misuse of results from DTC genetic test kits.
B. State Genetic Privacy Laws Vary in Presence and Rigidity
Across the Country
As of the publication of this Recent Development, only twentysix states have passed statutes regulating the disclosure of genetic
105

Ancestry Privacy Statement, supra note 28.
See Genetic Information, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (June 16,
2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/geneticinformation/index.html; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (2012).
107
See Our Story, supra note26 26 (establishing that Ancestry began selling
DTC genetic testing kits in 2002).
108
See Global Market Insights, supra note 9.
106
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information.109 These state laws vary widely in the limits placed
upon disclosure and use of other persons’ genetic information. 110
There is controversy between commentators as to whether genetic
information should be treated the same as other health
information.111 Some commentators agree that it should be regulated
in the same manner as non-genetic information, while others argue
that genetic information requires special legal protection due to its
unique properties—an approach called “genetic exceptionalism.”112
This disagreement among commentators is reflected in the content
of the genetic privacy statutes of states across the country.
Some state statutes are narrowly-tailored, similar to federal laws
such as GINA, and only prevent disclosure of genetic information
in instances where it would affect insurance or employment of an
individual.113 Meanwhile, other states have sweeping policies of
genetic information use that require formal and written consent of
the individual and restricts law enforcement from obtaining a
person’s genetic information without that individual’s consent.114
Only five state statutes define a person’s genetic information as their

State Genetic Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://pierce.wesleyancollege.edu/faculty/hboettger-tong/docs/hbt%20public%
20folder/FYS/State%20Genetic%20Summary%20Table%20on%20Privacy%20
Laws.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
110
See id.
111
See id.
112
See id. For a further description of genetic exceptionalism, see AMANDA K.
SARATA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34376, GENETIC EXCEPTIONALISM:
GENETIC INFORMATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 1 (2011) (“[Genetic exceptionalism]
is based on the supposition that genetic information itself embodies several
characteristics that may make it special and differentiate it from other medical or
even personal information. According to the perspective of genetic
exceptionalism, the characteristics of genetic information that make it different
include the following: (1) it can be predictive of future disease; (2) it is a unique
identifier; (3) it can reveal information about family members; (4) it is vertically
transmitted (passed from parent to child); (5) it can impact communities; (6) it can
be used to discriminate and stigmatize; and (7) it can cause serious psychological
harm.”).
113
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-909 (West 2019).
114
See, e.g., HEALTH, SAFETY, AND HOUSING—GENETIC PRIVACY, ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 18.13.010 (West 2019).
109
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own personal property.115 Alaska is the sole state to define a person’s
DNA sample as their own personal property.116 The following
analysis will provide a comparison between three different state
statutes (Alaska, New Mexico, and Maryland) concerning genetic
information privacy.
1. Alaska
In 2004, the legislature of Alaska enacted a law regulating
genetic privacy.117 This act is all-encompassing, setting forth an
individual’s right to their own DNA and how it is collected, stored,
or used.118 The Act requires written consent of an individual, or their
115

State Genetic Privacy Laws, supra note 109. The five states include Alaska,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana.
116
See id.
117
See § 18.13.010. This section, titled “Genetic testing” states:
Sec. 18.13.010. Genetic testing.
(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section,
(1) a person may not collect a DNA sample from a person, perform a
DNA analysis on a sample, retain a DNA sample or the results of a DNA
analysis, or disclose the results of a DNA analysis unless the person has
first obtained the informed and written consent of the person, or the
person’s legal guardian or authorized representative, for the collection,
analysis, retention, or disclosure;
(2) a DNA sample and the results of a DNA analysis performed on the
sample are the exclusive property of the person sampled or analyzed.
(b) The prohibitions of (a) of this section do not apply to DNA samples
collected and analyses conducted
(1) under AS 44.41.035 or comparable provisions of another jurisdiction;
(2) for a law enforcement purpose, including the identification of
perpetrators and the investigation of crimes and the identification of
missing or unidentified persons or deceased individuals;
(3) for determining paternity;
(4) to screen newborns as required by state or federal law;
(5) for the purpose of emergency medical treatment.
(c) A general authorization for the release of medical records or medical
information may not be construed as the informed and written consent
required by this section. The Department of Health and Social Services
may by regulation adopt a uniform informed and written consent form to
assist persons in meeting the requirements of this section. A person using
that uniform informed and written consent is exempt from civil or
criminal liability for actions taken under the consent form. A person may
revoke or amend their informed and written consent at any time.
118
See id.
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legal guardian, in order for their genetic data to be collected,
analyzed, retained, or disclosed.119 The statute further states “a DNA
sample and the results of a DNA analysis performed on the sample
are the exclusive property of the person sampled or analyzed.”120
This statute also sets forth penalties for any violation in the
collection, storage, or use of an individual’s genetic information.121
Anyone who violates the rules set forth in this law could be liable
for up to $5,000 in damages to any person who suffered harm, and
liable for up to $100,000 in damages to any person who suffered
harm if the violation “resulted in profit or monetary gain to the
violator.”122 A violator of this law could also be charged with the
crime of “unlawful DNA collection, analysis, retention, or
disclosure,” which is a class A misdemeanor.123 A person found
guilty of a class A misdemeanor could face up to one year in jail and
a fine of $10,000.124
The only foreseeably-desired safeguard that is not granted to
Alaskan citizens by this genetic privacy statute is protection from
unauthorized use of an individual’s genetic information by law
enforcement. The prohibitions of the Alaskan statute do not apply to
“DNA samples collected . . . for a law enforcement purpose,
including the identification of perpetrators and the investigation of
crimes and the identification of missing or unidentified persons or
deceased individuals.”125 The statute does not include any statement
of legislative intent describing why the law expressly excludes DNA
samples collected for a law enforcement purpose. But this exception
is unlikely to change at any point in the near future, because, as
mentioned in Section III, companies like Parabon have resolved
unfinished police cases through law enforcement use of DNA. These
recent successes are unlikely to alter the Alaskan legislature’s stance
119

Id.
Id.
121
§ 18.13.020.
122
Id.
123
§ 18.13.030.
124
See Ave Mince-Didier, Alaska Misdemeanor Crimes by Class and
Sentences, NOLO, https://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/alaskamisdemeanor-crimes-class-and-sentences.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
125
§ 18.13.010.
120
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on whether genetic privacy of an individual is protected when police
collect a DNA sample for police purposes.
The Alaskan genetic privacy statute also defines “DNA
analysis” as “DNA or genetic typing and testing to determine the
presence or absence of genetic characteristics in an individual.”126 It
further defines a “genetic characteristic” as “a gene, chromosome,
or alteration of a gene or chromosome that may be tested to
determine the existence or risk of a disease, disorder, trait,
propensity, or syndrome, or to identify an individual or a blood
relative.”127 Ancestry does not necessarily test for the presence or
absence of a risk for disease, disorder, trait, etc.128 It does, however,
provide results about a consumer’s “genetic ethnicity estimates and
. . . potential DNA matches, linking [the consumer] to others who
have taken the AncestryDNA test.”129 These results are produced
from Ancestry’s analysis of the consumer’s autosomal DNA, which
includes almost all of the twenty-two pairs of non-sex
chromosomes.130 Here, the definition of “DNA analysis” would
bring Ancestry within the scope of the law because the company’s
DTC genetic testing kit analyzes chromosomes to determine the
existence of a certain trait (ethnicity, risk for disease, etc.) and to
identify a potential relative.
The Alaskan genetic privacy statute vests property rights in an
individual to their own DNA sample and genetic information. The
law also sets forth a civil and criminal penalty for anyone who
misuses another’s DNA sample or genetic information. With the
expansive definition of “DNA analysis” in the statute, Ancestry
would be required to abide by the statute if it were in Alaska’s
jurisdiction. This is an idealistic genetic privacy law upon which a
new federal statute should be based in order to provide United States
citizens with as much protection as possible from having their
genetic information used against them.

126

See § 18.13.100 (emphasis added).
Id.
128
See ANCESTRYDNA, ANCESTRYDNA 101: THE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO DNA,
supra note 8.
129
Id.
130
See id.
127
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2. New Mexico
In 2015, New Mexico enacted its Genetic Information Privacy
Act (“GIPA”).131 GIPA defines genetic information as “information
about the genetic makeup of an individual or members of an
individual’s family, including information resulting from genetic
testing, genetic analysis, DNA composition, participation in genetic
research or use of genetic services.”132 GIPA’s definition for
“genetic analysis” includes chromosomal analysis, which tests for
“a propensity for or susceptibility to illness, disease, impairment or
other disorders.”133
GIPA requires informed and written consent of an individual in
order to collect, store, or disclose the individual’s genetic
information.134 But GIPA also provides a laundry list of exceptions
to this rule.135 The most interesting of these exceptions is one that

131

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-1 (West 2019).
§ 24-21-2.
133
Id.
134
§ 24-1-3.
135
Id. Subsection (C), entitled “Genetic Analysis Prohibited without Informed
Consent; Exceptions,” states:
An individual’s DNA, genetic information or the results of genetic
analysis may be obtained, retained, transmitted or used without the
individual’s written and informed consent pursuant to federal or state law
or regulations only:
(1) to identify an individual in the course of a criminal investigation by
a law enforcement agency;
(2) if the individual has been convicted of a felony, for purposes of
maintaining a DNA database for law enforcement purposes;
(3) to identify a deceased individual;
(4) to establish parental identity;
(5) to screen newborns;
(6) if the DNA, genetic information or results of genetic analysis are not
identified with the individual or the individual’s family members;
(7) by a court for determination of damage awards pursuant to the
Genetic Information Privacy Act;
(8) by medical repositories or registries;
(9) for the purpose of medical or scientific research and education,
including retention of gene products, genetic information or genetic
analysis if the identity of the individual or the individual’s family
members is not disclosed;
132
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allows for the unauthorized use, storage, and disclosure of a person’s
genetic information for the purpose of research and education.136
GIPA requires that the identity of the individual or their family not
be disclosed if their genetic information is used without
authorization in this circumstance,137 but if someone still objects,
there is an exception to the exception which prohibits that
unauthorized use.138 An individual, or representative of that
individual, is allowed to object on the basis of “religious tenets or
practices” to any unauthorized collection, storage, disclosure, or use
allowed under paragraphs 5, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of subsection (C).139
GIPA also prohibits use of genetic information to discriminate in
insurance, employment, housing, or lending situations.140 In
addition, GIPA provides that no one shall retain another’s genetic
information or DNA sample without first obtaining written consent
from the individual.141
There are established penalties for anyone who does not abide
by GIPA, but the penalties are limited to civil actions.142 The
attorney general, district attorney, or a person whose rights under
GIPA were violated all have the ability to bring a civil action against
a violator of GIPA.143 An injured individual is eligible to receive
actual damages, attorney fees, court costs, and up to $5,000 of
damages in addition to any economic loss if the violation was caused
by willful or grossly negligent conduct.144 Each separate occurrence

(10) for the purpose of emergency medical treatment consistent with
applicable law; or
(11) by a laboratory conducting an analysis or test of a specified
individual pursuant to a written order to the laboratory from a health care
practitioner or the health care practitioner’s agent, including by
electronic transmission.
Id.
136

Id.
See id.
138
§ 24-21-3.
139
See id.
140
§ 24-21-4.
141
§ 24-21-5.
142
§ 24-21-6.
143
See id.
144
See id.
137
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of wrongful collection, storage, disclosure, or use of genetic
information is treated as an actionable violation of GIPA.145
The New Mexico genetic privacy law is well-rounded, but does
not protect the consumer of a DTC genetic testing kit from misuse
as well as Alaska’s genetic privacy act. The scope of GIPA includes
DTC genetic test kit companies like Ancestry because the statutory
definitions of “genetic information” and “genetic analysis” include
autosomal analyses and the results thereof, which Ancestry
conducts. GIPA does offer individuals the right to retain their DNA
and genetic information, but it does not classify either as the
individual’s personal property.146 GIPA attempts to prohibit
unauthorized collection, disclosure, and use of genetic information,
but attaches a long list of exceptions to that rule.147 The Act offers a
unique religious objection to unauthorized use of a person’s genetic
data, but the statute never defines what qualifies as “religious tenets
or practices.” It is unclear whether this religious exemption will be
as low of a hurdle as some of the religious exemptions allowed by
state vaccine laws, which are notorious for being exploited by nonreligious people.148 Further, GIPA does not include criminal
penalties for violations, but the statute is proactive enough to
distinguish that each instance of wrongful conduct is a separate and
actionable violation of the law which can result in a civil penalty. 149
This could add up for a company such as Ancestry if there were a
case of mass misuse of genetic information among the considerable
amount of personal data they store.

145

Id.
See § 24-21-3.
147
See id.
148
See Martha Quillin, Thousands of NC Students Aren’t Vaccinated – All
Because of This Easy Exemption, NEWS & OBSERVER (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politicsgovernment/article188633004.html; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-157 (2018)
(“If the bona fide religious beliefs of an adult or the parent, guardian or person in
loco parentis of a child are contrary to the immunization requirements contained
in this Chapter, the adult or the child shall be exempt from the requirements . . .
[u]pon submission of a written statement . . . .”)
149
See § 24-21-6.
146

294

N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON.

[VOL. 20: 267

3. Maryland
In 1997, the legislature of Maryland passed the first draft of its
only statute pertaining to genetic privacy, titled “Use of Genetic
Tests to Affect Terms or Conditions of Health Insurance Policies or
Contracts Prohibited.”150 The most recent version of this statute
became effective in 2011 and remains narrow in scope of restrictions
upon disclosure of genetic information.151 This statute consists of
regulations in two subsections: (1) the use of genetic tests to affect
terms or conditions of health insurance policies and (2) disclosure
of identifiable genetic information to authorized employees or
health care providers.152 The first subsection of the statute is prefaced
with a statement that it does not apply to life insurance policies,
annuity contracts, long-term care insurance policies, or disability
insurance policies.153 Next is a statement that prohibits insurers,
nonprofit health service plans, and health maintenance organizations
from using genetic information to influence the terms, conditions,
or price of a health policy or contract.154 This section also prohibits
the release of genetic information without the concerned
individual’s written consent.155 The second subsection of the statute
150

MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-909 (West 2019).
See id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. The full text of this subsection is as follows:
An insurer, nonprofit health service plan, or health maintenance
organization may not:
(1) use a genetic test, the results of a genetic test, genetic information, or
a request for genetic services, to reject, deny, limit, cancel, refuse to
renew, increase the rates of, affect the terms or conditions of, or
otherwise affect a health insurance policy or contract;
(2) request or require a genetic test, the results of a genetic test, or genetic
information for the purpose of determining whether or not to issue or
renew health benefits coverage; or
(3) release identifiable genetic information or the results of a genetic test
to any person who is not an employee of the insurer, nonprofit health
service plan, or health maintenance organization or a participating health
care provider who provides medical services to insureds or enrollees
without the prior written authorization of the individual from whom the
test results or genetic information was obtained.
Id.
151
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limits disclosure of identifiable genetic information to an authorized
employee or health care provider only to situations in which (1) a
patient needs medical care, or (2) for the purpose of conducting
legal, board-approved research.156
The definitions in this statute are far more constricted than those
of the Alaska statute.157 “Genetic information” is defined as
information:
1. about chromosomes, genes, gene products, or inherited characteristics
that may derive from an individual or a family member; 2. obtained for
diagnostic and therapeutic purposes; and 3. obtained at a time when the
individual to whom the information relates is asymptomatic for the
disease.158

“Genetic information” does not include regular physical
measurements; clinical analyses of blood, urine, or chemicals; drug
tests; or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) tests.159
Violation of the Maryland statute does not lead to any civil
action or criminal penalty against an individual.160 But if a violator
is an insurance company, they may receive a cease-and-desist order
which commands the insurer to immediately shut down all insurance
writing the company performs in the state of Maryland.161 As
mentioned earlier, this Maryland statute does not place many limits
on the collection, storage, or use of an individual’s genetic
information.162 The purpose of the legislation was to regulate and
prevent deceptive practices in the business of insurance.163 This was
intended to keep insurance providers from benefitting through
discriminatory methodologies such as fixing the policy rates at a
higher price for someone who is moderately overweight and
refusing to come down on the price until that person provides a
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Id.
See id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.; see also § 4-114 (providing for issuance of a cease-and-desist order of
anyone found in violation of the Maryland genetic privacy law).
162
See § 27-909.
163
See § 27-101.
157
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genetic screening result that shows no genetic predisposition to
diabetes.
The statute could, however, give insurers flexibility to employ
deceptive practices in making insurance transactions. For example,
an insurance provider could discriminately request that a healthy
man produce a genetic screen for any theoretical genetic
susceptibility to one of the enumerated exclusions to “genetic
information.”164 This deceptive practice could easily carry over to
the DTC genetic testing industry under this statute because it
provides for no regulation of collection, storage, or use of genetic
information outside the realm of insurance practices. Under
Maryland’s only genetic information privacy act, genealogy
companies such as Ancestry are yet again left to regulate their own
handling of consumer’s DNA.
V. THE VISION: A PROPOSITION TO PREVENT MISUSE OF DNA
SAMPLES AND GENETIC INFORMATION
A new, all-encompassing federal statute is necessary to bring
DTC genetic test kit companies within the scope of uniform
regulation. As laws across the United States currently stand, some
states can regulate Ancestry’s actions with respect to genetic
information, some states can only regulate genetic information in a
health care and insurance context, and almost half of the states
provide no guidance at all on a citizen’s genetic privacy rights. This
incoherence amongst the states provides DTC genetic test kit
companies an advantage over their consumers. The companies can
implement choice-of-law clauses in their terms and conditions to
preemptively apply law from a state with little or no regulation of
genetic privacy.165 This in turn allows these companies broader
collection, storage, disclosure, and use rights of consumers’ genetic
information without fear of any liability. In fact, Ancestry has
164
For purposes of this example, the genetic screen is testing for information
not included within GINA’s definition of genetic information.
165
John F. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92
WASH. L. REV. 631, 634 (2017) (observing that sophisticated contracting parties,
such as insurance companies, may research laws of multiple jurisdictions and
draft a choice-of-law clause that incorporates the law most favorable to the
sophisticated party).
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specified Utah as the state law which governs all terms and uses of
its service for consumers within the United States.166 Interestingly
enough, Utah’s genetic privacy laws only prohibit the misuse of
genetic information in employment and insurance contexts, leaving
DTC genetic test kit companies unregulated.167 A federal law would
provide uniformity in genetic privacy laws across the country and
prevent DTC genetic test kit companies from forum-shopping for
states that would provide little to no penalty at all for misuse of
genetic information.
This federal law must also effectively regulate DTC genetic test
kit companies. An effective federal law would be one that is not too
narrow in scope and regulates all of a person or entity’s interactions
with another’s genetic information: collection, storage, and use. The
scope of the law should not be confined to insurance providers for
the purpose of defeating deceptive practices. The reach of the law
should extend to any person, company, or government entity that
has an initial interaction with a person’s genetic information outside
of the ordinary course of medical interactions or law enforcement
operations where acquisition of genetic information is routine. The
effective law would not infringe on medical or law enforcement
professionals’ ability to execute their ordinary business with DNA
samples and genetic information they produce. But the law would
prohibit those professionals, and any other person, from collecting,
storing, or using DNA samples and genetic data that they did not
produce—such as those found on genealogy sites, like Ancestry, or
on compilation databases, like GEDmatch.168
An effective federal law would prohibit the initial collection,
continued storage, or prolonged use of a person’s genetic
information without the concerned individual’s informed and
written consent. In addition, it would vest personal property rights
of DNA and DNA samples in the fabricator of said DNA or DNA
sample. This would ensure a DTC genetic testing kit consumer has
166
See Ancestry Terms and Conditions, ANCESTRYDNA (June 5, 2018),
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/termsandconditions.
167
See State Genetic Privacy Laws, supra note 109; see also UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 26-45-101 to -106 (West 2019) (providing statutory penalties and civil rights
of action for misuse of genetic information by only employers and insurers).
168
See Snow & Schuppe, supra note 51.
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greater control over his own voluntarily-submitted sample, rather
than just trusting the company will abide by their privacy policy and
return the sample and other information when asked. In order to
ensure DNA samples are returned to their rightful owners, the ideal
law would provide a right of retention to the person from whom the
DNA was produced.
In the event a DTC genetic test kit company does misuse DNA
samples or genetic information, a suitable federal law must also
provide effective deterrence and discipline. Each individual instance
of genetic information misuse should constitute a separate and
actionable violation of the statute. Each violation of the statute
should provide for both civil (money damages) and criminal (jail
time and fine) liability. DNA samples and genetic information are
highly valuable in today’s world; the law should treat them as such.
Lastly, a desirable federal genetic information privacy act
prohibits disclosure, acquisition, or use of a person’s genetic sample
or information by law enforcement without the concerned
individual’s informed consent. The interests of law enforcement
must be balanced with the interests of the public, similar to the
ideology behind the Maryland bill proposed by Charles Sydnor. Law
enforcement has an interest in using all available resources that may
lead to the identification and apprehension of criminals.169 The DTC
genetic test kit users have an interest in maintaining the privacy of
their genetic information. The United States’ Constitution grants
citizens a right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as well
as protection from warrants issued without probable cause.170 The
government should abide by that policy by further protecting its
citizens’ genetic information from warrantless and unauthorized use
by third parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
While it is laudable that DTC genetic testing companies, such as
Ancestry, are implementing privacy policies with self-imposed
limitations on handling of consumers’ genetic information, it is
important to remember that those companies are still businesses.
169
170

See Watts, supra note 67.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

MAY 2019]

Federal Regulation over DNA Test Kits

299

Businesses exist to make profit, and genetic information holds near
infinite opportunity for profit.171 The need for a uniform, allencompassing federal law that regulates collection, storage,
disclosure, and use of genetic information is mounting in urgency as
DTC genetic testing kits rise in popularity. These genetic testing kit
companies collect, store, and use Americans’ DNA without much
federal oversight. A little over half of states have already recognized
the threat to their citizens’ safety and enacted legislation towards
limiting the manners in which a concerned individual’s DNA could
be used against them. The potential for discrimination by an insurer,
unauthorized distribution of a DNA sample, or unrestricted access
to DNA by law enforcement exemplify the need for immediate
implementation of an updated federal genetic information privacy
act. Protection from discrimination alone through genetic
information is no longer sufficient protection.
The discrepancies between the three state statutes discussed in
this article provide a sampling of the variance among all twenty-six
current state laws concerning genetic information privacy. This lack
of uniformity allows companies such as Ancestry to “shop” for a
jurisdiction with more passive laws regarding the handling of
genetic information, lessening the likelihood Ancestry could be
found liable under any statute were the company to misuse genetic
information. An effective federal law would create uniform law in
all fifty states, preventing companies from forum-shopping for a
way to legally exploit sensitive data. An effective federal genetic
privacy law would deter, discipline, and hold DTC genetic test kit
companies accountable for any misuse of consumers’ genetic
material.
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See, e.g., Michael Grothaus, How 23andMe is Monetizing Your DNA, FAST
CO. (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3040356/what-23andme-isdoing-with-all-that-dna (reporting a sixty million dollar deal 23andMe acquired
by offering up data from members of its Parkinson’s disease community).

